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RECENT DECISIONS
Negligence: Contractor's Liability for Discoverable Defect after
Acceptance by Owner-Plaintiff was injured when a basin fell from
the wall of the bathroom of a motel unti occupied by him. Evidence
was presented from which it might be inferred that the fixture was
mounted on its supporting bracket in a precarious and improper man-
ner, and that this dangerous condition was not apparent upon ordinary
inspection. The trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict by
the installing plumber, apparently because of a lack of a contractual
relationship with the plaintiff. The plumbing company had finished its
work thirteen months before the injury, and the work had been accept-
ed by the owner of the premises.
The Florida Supreme Court held for the defendant plumbing com-
pany on the ground that no dangerous agency was involved and in the
absence of such, contractors are not liable to third persons after their
work is completed and accepted by the owner. Slavin v. Kay,- Fla.-
180 So. 2d 462 (1959).
Florida had previously recognized only one exception to a con-
tractor's non-liability, that being when the instrumentality which
caused the damage was of a hazardous nature or inherently dangerous.'
On rehearing, held for plaintiff. The court said that the case of
Carter v. Livesay Window Co. 2 was not to be construed to limit re-
covery from the contractor only where an inherently dangerous instru-
mentality was involved. Non-liability of the contractor is usually
predicted on a finding of intervening negligence on the part of the
owner in failing to correct the dangerous condition that proximately
caused the injury. After the owner has accepted the work the con-
tractor no longer has an opportunity to rectify his negligence. The
owner is presumed to have inspected the premises and to know of its
defects and injuries to third parties are considered to be caused by the
negligence of the owner in failing to correct these defects. 3 This rea-
soning is not applicable where the defect is undiscoverable by a rea-
sonable inspection. Thus the Florida court held that the contractor's
liability is terminated by acceptance of the owner "only so far as the
acceptor is to assume responsibility.' 4 The contractor's negligence is
not superceded by the owner's if the defect could not have been dis-
covered by a reasonable inspection, since the owner himself would not
be negligent in failing to correct a defect which he could not reasonably
discover. However, if the owner fails to discover a defect which is
'Breeding's Dania Drug Co. v. Runyan, 147 Fla. 123, 2 So. 2d 376 (1941)
Carter v. Livesay Window Company, .. Fla .. , 73 So. 2d 411 (1954).
2 Id.
3 Casey v. Wrought Iron Bridge Co., 114 Mo. App. 47, 89 S.W. 330 (1905).
4 Slavin v. Kay, .. Fla. ... 108 So. 2d 462 (at 467 (1959).
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discoverable on a reasonable inspection the contractor is relieved of
liability, even though the defect is neither obvious nor actually known
to the owner.5
A contractor can be liable to third parties for harm caused by the
negligent performance of his contract. Generally, however, after the
work has been completed, turned over to, and accepted by the owner,
the contractor is not liable to third persons for injuries suffered by
reason of the condition of the work.6 The courts have reasoned that
the opposite result would unduly burden the industry,7 and that the
contractor's negligence has been superceded by the owner's failure to
remedy a known defect."
Liability was first imposed on manufacturers and suppliers of
defective chattels by making exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability and the same course has been followed in imposing liability on
contractors. Liability has been imposed on the basis of fraud, mis-
representation, ° implied warranty,'" and an implied invitation by the
contractor to the general public to use the premises with an implied
promise by him to accept responsibility for injuries caused by his negli-
gence. 12 Liability has also been imposed where the work constitutes a
5Id. "No compelling, or for that matter, valid, reason can be advanced for
enforcing the asserted public policy against liability on the part of such a
contractor further than to relieve him of liability on account of dangerous
conditions which an owner or intermediate party could discover and remedy."(Italics mine.)6 Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244, 12 L.R.A. 322 (1891); Ford v.
Sturgis, 56 App. D.C. 361, 14 F. 2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619 (1926).7Curtin v. Somerset, supra note 6, 21 At. at 245. "the consequences of holding
the opposite doctrine would be far reaching. If a contractor who erects a
house, who builds a bridge, or performs any other work, a manufacturer who
constructs a boiler, a piece of machinery or a steamship, owes a duty to the
whole world that his work or his machine or his steamship shall contain nohidden defect, it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and
no prudent man would engage in such occupations under such conditions. It
is safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties immediately con-
cerned." Galbraith v. Illinois Steel Co., 133 Fed. 485 (7th Cir. 1904).8 Casey v. Wrought Iron Bridge Co., supra note 3. "By occupying and re-
suming possession of the work the owner deprives the contractor of all op-
portunity to rectify his wrong. Before accepting the work as being in full
compliance with the terms of the contract, he is presumed to have made
a reasonably careful inspection thereof and to know of its defects, and if he
takes it in the defective condition, he accepts the defects and negligence that
caused them as his own, and thereafter stands forth as their author. Whenhe accepts work that is in a dangerous condition, the immediate duty devolved
upon him to make it safe, and if he fails to perform this duty, and a third
person is injured, it is his negligence that is the proximate cause of the in-jury. His liability may be incurred either from his substitution for the con-
tractor, or from his neglect to repair."
9 Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Elmore and Hamilton Contracting Co., 175 Fed. 176
(N.D. N.Y. 1909); O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W.
1012, 32 L.R.A., (n.s.) 980 (1910) ; Ford v. Sturgis, supra note 6.10 Lewis . Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398, 31 L.R.A. 220 (1896); Muruphy v.
Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 289 N.W. 563 (1939).
:"Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 238
(1907).12 Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162, 60 A.L.R. 353 (1928).
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"nuisance",13 or is inherently, intrinsically, or imminently dangerous
to third persons,14 and where the owner would not have discovered the
defect on a reasonable inspection. 15
At present the liability of a negligent contractor parallels that of a
negligent manufacturer, except that a manufacturer of a defective
chattel is liable even though the intermediate party, recipient of the
chattel, failed to inspect it to find a discoverable defect.Y0 In some
jurisdictions a manufacturer is liable even though the intermediate
party had actual knowledge of the defect, if the defect is imminently
and intrinsically dangerous."' If the defect is not so considered, gen-
erally, the manufacturer's negligence is superceded only by the negli-
gence of the intermediate party who passes the chattel on to a third
party after he actually discovers the defect, without correcting it or
warning the third party of it.18 However, although the Restatement of
Torts19 and a leading text writer 20 take the contrary position, the
13 Ford v. Sturgis, supra note 6; Schumacher v. Carl G. Neumann Dredging
and Imp. Co., 206 Wis. 220, 239 N.W. 459 (1931).
14 Galbraith v. Illinois Steel Co., supra note 7; Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64
Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
15 Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., supra note 12; Home Insurance Co. of N.Y.
v. Michael Hoffmann Fuel, 126 F. Supp. 652 (D. Conn. 1954); Reynolds v.
Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S.W. 2d 714 (1954).
16 Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923) ; Flies
v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
17 Clement v. Crosby and Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907); Kentucky
Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925) ; Farley
v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930).
18 Old's Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911); Stultz v.
Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P. 2d 100 (1936); Stout v. Madden,
208 Ore. 294, 300 P. 2d 461 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §388, comment
1 provides that if the probable harm from the defect is trivial, it is reasonable
for a manufacturer to expect the intermediate party to make the chattel safe
for third parties upon acquiring knowledge of it. But if the probable harm is
great, it is not reasonable for the manufacturer to shift his burden to the
intermediate party. Even though the intermediate party has actual knowl-
edge of the defect, the negligent manufacturer is not relieved of liability.
19 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §385 (1934). "One who on behalf of the possessor of
land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to
liability to others within or without the land for bodily harm caused to them
by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has
been accepted by the possessor under the same rules as those stated in §394
to 398, 403 and 404 as determining the liability of one who as manufacturer
or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of others.
"As to the effect of the employer's knowledge of the dangerous character
of the structure or condition when he accepts it from the servant or con-
tractor, see §388, comment I." See supra note 18.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §396 (1934), "A manufacturer of a chattel is subject
to liability under the rules stated in §394 to 395, although the dangerous
character or condition of the chattel is discoverable by an inspection which the
vendor or any other person is under a duty to the person injured to make."
20 PRossER, TORTS, §85, p. 519 (2d ed. 1955). "In the only cases that have been
found on the point, it has been held that the employer's failure to discover
the defect will not relieve the contractor of liability; but that if he discovers
the danger, or it is obvious to him, his responsibility supercedes that of the
contractor." To support this point, Professor Prosser cites Foley v. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Co., 263 Pa. 1, 68 A. 2d 517 (1949). That case can be
explained as an example of imposing liability where the defect is inherently
[Vol. 43
RECENT DECISIONS
majority rule is that a contractor's negligence is superceded by the
failure of the intermediate party to correct a defect which is discover-
able upon reasonable inspection.21 Actual knowledge of the defect by
the intermediate party is not needed to relieve the contractor of lia-
bility.
The only deviation from this majority view appears to be Inman v.
Binghamton Housing Authority.2 2 Plaintiff fell from the porch of an
apartment leased from the authority when the railing broke. The
defendant cross-complained against builder and architect of the dwell-
ing for the negligence in erecting and designing the defective porch
railing. The court held that for a third person to recover against a
negligent contractor the defect must be latent or not discoverable on a
reasonable inspection. At first it would appear that by this decision
New York places itself with the majority view on this issue. However,
the Inman case used the defective chattel in Rosebrock v. General
Electric Co.23 as an example of a latent defect. In that case the defec-
tive instrumentalities were two electrical transformers shipped with
wooden blocks inside them. A reasonable inspection would have dis-
closed the defect. Thus "latent defect" may not mean the same in New
York as "defect discoverable on a reasonable inspection", and if not,
New York would then be close to the rule of the Restatement of Torts,
Section 385.24 Further, another New York court has applied the Inman
doctrine to allow a plaintiff to recover from the negligent manufacturer
of a defective chattel.2 5 It is doubted that New York would extend
the contractor immunity theory of the Inman case, to the manufacturer
of a chattel if "latent defect" had such a restricted meaning.
CONCLUSION
Although the Florida case again refused to hold a contractor liable
where the defect could be discovered by the intermediate party, it is
doubtful that Florida and other jurisdictions, will retain this fragment
of an antiquated rule. The rule of non-liability of a contractor to per-
sons not in privity with him exists unaltered in only a few jurisdictions
today. There is no reason to retain this non-liability when the defect is
discoverable by the intermediate party. Rather, the law of intervening
and imminently dangerous to third persons. See 11 PITT. L. REv. 237 and
notes 2 and 14 supra.
21 Healey v. Heidel, 210 Ill. App. 387 (1918) ; Price v. Johnston Cotton Co. of
Wendell, 226 N.C. 758, 40 S.E. 2d 344 (1946); Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Michael Hoffmann Fuel, supra note 15; Reynolds v. M'anley, supra note 15;
Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P. 2d 352 (1952).
22 1 App. Div. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 79 (3d Dept. 1956), rev'd. 3 N.Y. 2d 137, 143
N.E. 2d 895 (1957).
23 Supra note 16.
24 However, see Paul v. Staten Island Edison Corporation, 2 App. Div. 2d 311,
155 N.Y. 2d 427, 436 (1956) : "A latent danger is one that is neither visible
nor discoverable by ordinary inspection or test." Also see 4 Defense L.J. 56.
25 Thomas v. Jerominek, 8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (1958).
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causes should and in the near future probably will apply to such situa-
tions. Under this law, the courts would consider the magnitude of the
risk involved, and even though the defect is discoverable, the con-
tractor would be responsible if he could reasonably forsee that the
intermediate party would fail to inspect the work for defects. It is
anticipated that the general rule will eventually be that a contractor is
to be relieved of liability for injuries to third parties only when he is
not at fault in creating the situation. DAVID L. WALTHER
Constitutional Law: Health Inspections Without a Warrant-
An inspector of the Baltimore City Health Department, acting on a
complaint of rodent infestation, inspected the area to determine its
source. He discovered a pile, later identified as, "rodent feces mixed
with straw and trash and debris to approximately half a ton," in the
rear of petitioner's house. Although he had no warrant to gain entry,
the inspector sought permission to inspect the basement area .The peti-
tioner refused. Therefore, the following afternoon the petitioner was
arrested and found guilty of refusing entry to a health inspector in
violation of Section 120 of Article 12 of the Baltimore City Code.1
The petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the
grounds that Section 120 denied him due process of law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amedment in that it violated the search and seizure
clause of the Fourth Amendment. Held: The conviction was affirmed
in a five-four decision. 2
The court recognized that "the 'security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police' is fundamental to a free society and
as such protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, ' 3 but went on to
say: "Application of the broad restraints of due process compels in-
quiry into the nature of the demand being made upon individual free-
dom in a particular context and the justification of social need on
which the demand rests."
4
Examing the background of the constitutional amendments, the
Court declared that two protections emerged from the Fourth Amend-
ment.5 The first of these is the right to personal privacy-the right to
be secure from intrusions without proper authority of law. The second
is "self-protection"-the right to be secure from searches for evidence
1 Baltimore, Md., Code Art. 12, §120: "Whenever the Commissioner of Health
shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or en-
closure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner or
occupier shall refuse or delay the same and admit a free examination, he
shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal or delay the sum of Twenty
Dollars."
2 Frank v. -Maryland, 79 S.Ct. 804 (1959).
3 Id. at 807, citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948).
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 808.
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